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MICHAEL R. MOORE*

Native American Water Rights:
Efficiency and Fairness
ABSTRACT
This essay characterizes the setting for Native American water
rights in economic, legal, and historical terms. A simple way of
understanding the water claims, in part, is as a dispute over water
between the Indian nations, as prospective water users, and established users of western water rights. The fewer opportunitiesto build
new water-supplyprojects reduces the ability to sustain non-Indian
use at historic levels and, simultaneously, to accommodate new Indian uses. This transforms Indian water rights into controversial
resource disputes. The dilemma justifies considering a new approach
to the issue.
Three premises guide the approach. Two of them argue that the
federal government should recognize the legitimateproperty interests
of both Indians and non-Indians. This essay supports the fairness of
the first two premises. The government has the responsibility to
pursue solutions to the conflict through some combination of developing new water supply, purchasing water rights, or substituting
monetary compensationfor water rights. The third premise gives to
the government the authority to negotiate cost-efficient solutions to
the disputes.
A generic approachto solving the water conflicts is recommended.
The two partiesto the dispute share equally the scarce water resource
at issue. A government subsidy, then, sustains individual property
rights by substituting money for the value of the water right. The
two parties remain whole in their wealth status rather than in a
physical, water-right status.
Three other recommendations give additional substance to the
procedurefor quantifying Indian water rights, arguefor subsidized
water conveyance to the reservations, and suggest prospective sources
of funds to earmark for the necessary government expenditures. A
*Moore is a resource economist with the Resources and Technology Division, Economic Research
Service. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The author thanks Marcel Aillery, John Hostetler, Benjamin
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author also thanks the members of his dissertation committee, Jonathon Bulkley, Richard Porter,
Carol Jones, and Roger Gordon. Remaining deficiencies in the paper are the author's responsibility.
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context of both the original goal of Indian water-to develop sustainable communities on the reservation lands-and the record of
federal management of Indian and non4ndian water development
supports the recommendations.

The most intractable problem the Commission faced is the conflict
between existing non-Indian users and newly initiated Indian withdrawals. While the Indians often have legal superiority to make use
of water, a later initiated Indian use often would disrupt preexisting
non-Indian uses representing large Federal, State, and private investments.
National Water Commission'
There is urgency of a considerably grand scale to this need to channel
the scattering forces and build predictable doctrine .... Indian water
rights cases are typically as complex as major antitrust actions. Most
of the great rivers of the ard West have major Indian holdings within
their drainages and, while extensive litigation is inevitable, the scope
of the cases can be narrowed by reasoned precedent.
Lack of a reasonably well defined matrix of doctrine also undercuts
one of the most encouraging developments in Indian country-the
increasing willingness of tribes and states to settle their differences
extrajudicially. This growing atmosphere of cooperation is inevitably
premised upon the existence of doctrinal benchmarks to guide parties
at the bargaining table.
Charles F. Wilkinson2
INTRODUCTION
A great drama is unfolding in the American West: the assertion of
Native American surface-water rights. The drama exists because the rights
rested as fallow property since 1908; consequently, they conflict directly
with traditional appropriative water rights. Further, they are members of
the class of federal reserved water rights. Federal rights are altering the
traditional state domain over surface water, which has been managed
through the states' prior appropriation systems.
The transformation of Native American claims into water rights3 will
I. National Water Commission, Water Policies for the Future 483 (1973).
2. C. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law 9 (1987).
3. "Rights" and "claims" are not used synonymously in this paper. The reservation tribes' rights
to water are well established. Their water claims, as an assertion of the volume of the rights, may
underestimate or overestimate the ultimate, legal water right. As a matter of bargaining, one expects
that the claim exceeds the right. That is, either the volume of the claim may exceed the volume of
the right or the claim itself may be inherently invalid. The distinction between rights and claims is
made while recognizing its negative connotation to Indians, represented by Deloria:
This initial step [of defining the traits of the right] is vitally important to the American legal
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affect the economic efficiency of western water use, the economic and
social status of both Indian and non-Indian communities, and the relationship between the western states and the federal government. This
essay describes the setting for Native American claims, describes and
supports three general premises that guide the reconciliation of the competing claims to surface water, evaluates the decisionmaking context for
the existence and the scope of the Indian right, and makes four recommendations concerning the resolution of the issue.4 The recommendations

form a general, policy perspective for the scope of Indian water rights
and for the management of conflicts over the allocation of water resources
that they engender.

The adoption and implementation of the recommendations will set in
motion a process that meets several objectives of sound public policy:
fairness to the disputants, economic efficiency in water-resource use, and
cost efficiency in the government's management of the dispute. Many
commentators discuss the need to bring certainty and stability to the
western waterscape so that water-resource planning and water markets
can develop to allocate water resources efficiently. This essay provides a

comprehensive perspective on a method to settle one major aspect of the
current uncertainty in western water markets, the uncertainty surrounding
Indian water claims.
THE SETTING
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the famous case of Winters v. United
States in 1908,- found that when the Indian reservations were created,
sufficient water was reserved implicitly for Indian tribes to sustain human
communities on the arid and semi-arid reservation lands. The Court recognized at that time a new class of western surface water rights, the
federal reserved water right (or Winters doctrine right). The Indian water
system because the broadest scope of Indian rights can, in this context, be characterized as
Indian "claims" to water. As the legal system proceeds to narrow these claims, society can
assure itself that it is merely "defining rights," not taking them away.
Deloria, A Native American View of Western Water Development, 21 Water Resources Res. 1785,
1785 (1985).
4. The approach of stating premises and making recommendations parallels that of the National
Water Commission in its chapter on Indian water rights. National Water Commission, supra note
1, at 473. The fact that the commission devoted one of the 17 chapters of its final report to Indian
water is important: the final report and the studies that contributed to it represent the most comprehensive and detailed study of water policy in this country. The federal government did not accept
the commission's recommendations on Indian water. Consequently, the recommendations made in
this paper are designed to achieve objectives similar to the commission's goals. This paper's recommendations have the advantage of 16 years of additional experience since publication of the
commission's report. The commission's proposal remains important because so few recommendations
from a general, objective perspective have been made on the topic. The commission's mandate was
to draw conclusions and make recommendations "on the policies which it believes the Nation should
adopt at this point in its history for the efficient, equitable, and environmentally responsible management of its water resources." Id. at iii.
5. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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right is the charter member of this class of water rights. For most of the
century, Winters rights were treated as an illusion, and were ignored. In
the case of Arizona v. California in 1963, the Supreme Court confirmed
the reality of federal reserved rights by explicitly allocating to Indian
reservations more than ten percent of the apportionment of the lower
Colorado River.6 The potential impact on western water allocation of
Winters rights and, in particular, Indian water rights only now is being
perceived.
Native American water claims are pervasive in the West: 60 of these
cases already are in court, with the total volume of claims to water
reaching 45 million acre-feet per year.7 The claims involve 60 western
water basins and over 100 Indian communities. Further, though frequently
not mentioned, at least 100 (and probably more) non-Indian rural and
urban communities are involved directly in the water-allocation decisions
associated with Indian claims: they use water that reservation communities
now claim.'
Native American water rights are of great symbolic value to the Indian
nations. 9 A clear analogy exists, from their perspective, between ownership of their original homelands and ownership of water: they lost their
homelands and feel threatened with the loss of their water rights. " Indian
water, in this light, provides a rare opportunity for the reservation com6. 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree entered by Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), decree
amended by Arizona v. California, 383 U.S. 268 (1966), order amended by Arizona v. California,
466 U.S. 144 (1984). The decision allocated to five Indian reservations along the Colorado River
more than 900,000 acre-feet per year. California received an annual allocation of 4.4 million acrefeet, Arizona 2.8 million acre-feet, and Nevada 300,000 acre-feet. Allocating water to Indians was
necessary because of the blatant disregard for Indian water rights in the Colorado River Compact.
According to Norris Hundley, Jr., the noted historian of the Colorado River,
Their rights were considered "negligible" and were dealt with perfunctorily in what [Herbert]
Hoover called the "wild Indian article": "Nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting
the obligations of the United States of America to Indian tribes."
Hundley, The West Against Itself: The ColoradoRiver-An Institutional History, in New Courses
for the Colorado River 18 (1986). Although Arizona v. Californiaallocated a large volume of water
to, the tribes, approximately 20 outstanding Indian claims remain in the Colorado River basin.
The symposium that served as the basis for the aforementioned book began with an address by
former Arizona Governor Bruce Babbitt and ended with a summary by Dr. Gilbert White. Babbitt
identified Indian claims as one of two major issues of the Colorado River in the next century. White
identified them as one of seven major unresolved issues of the river. See Babbitt, Forward: The
Future of the ColoradoRiver, in New Courses for the Colorado River xi (1986); White, A New
Confluence in the Life of the River, id. at 220.
7. Riley, The Water Wars, 7 Nat. L. J., Feb. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 2; see J. Folk-Williams, What
Indian Water Means to the West (1982) (an exceptionally thorough description of the existing Native
American water claims); Indian Water 1985: Collected Essays (C. Miklas & S. Shupe eds. 1986)
[hereinafter Indian Water 1985] (discussion of many of the water policy and management issues
associated with these claims).
8. For a detailed account of the location and nature of Indian water rights, see J. Folk-Williams,
supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., A. Kneese & F. Brown, Southwest Under Stress (1981); Weatherford, Wallace, &
Harold, Leasing Indian Water: Upcoming Choices in the ColoradoRiver Basin, in Water Marketing:
Opportunities and Challenges of a New Era 42 (S. Shupe ed. 1986).
10. Deloria, supra note 3, at 1785-86.
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munities to develop, both culturally and economically. The symbolic value

of water provides a new, common identity: it is a resource that the tribes
learned to struggle for in the courtroom and that they are learning to
manage in their best interest." Further, water provides a renewable resource base upon which to foster the development of the reservations.
This contrasts to a reliance on an exhaustible resource base, such as coal,
oil, or uranium. Most tribes experienced only temporary increases in their
standard of living from the extraction of their exhaustible resources. 2 In
the era of Indian self determination with its renewed commitment to the
reservations as Indian communities,' 3 water rights represent a necessary
resource endowment for achieving a measure of economic independence.
Two avenues are open to Indians once they file water claims: to participate in a general stream adjudication in state court 4 (which is subject
to federal review), or to enter into settlement negotiations with the pertinent state governments, the federal government, and the affected established water users. The historic trend has been to rely on negotiation as
the primary method to settle the water-resource disputes. This occurred
for two reasons. First, successful negotiations attached Indian water onto
federal water projects that were under construction, thereby effectively
keeping the status of all the parties to the dispute constant, or whole, in
the volume of water that they own."' Second, the litigation and adjudiII. The American Indian Resources Institute, located in Berkeley, California, holds annual workshops on Indian water management. The 1986 course, for example, was entitled "1986 Summer
Course on Tribal Water Management." It included the study of water law, policy, economics,
hydrology, administration, and management.
12. The economic status of reservation communities remains strikingly low by American standards. Unemployment among Indians on reservations was a steady rate of 35 percent throughout
the early 1980s. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian Service Population
and Labor Force Estimates 2 (1985). Indians on reservations living below poverty levels in 1979
ranged from 5 percent to 100 percent, with a figure in the range of 30 percent to 50 percent typical.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population: General Social
and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary 457 (1980).
13. Cornell traces the change in federal policy toward Native Americans from the period of
segregation on the reservations, through the long period that had a goal of assimilating the Indians
into the dominant American culture, to the episodic transition to self-government and economic
independence. Cornell, The New Indian Politics, Wilson Q. 113 (1986); see also Weatherford,
Wallace, & Harold, supra note 9, at 27-29.
14. The Indian nations prefer their legal cases to be heard in federal court rather than in a state
court's general adjudication. The McCarran Amendment of 1952, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982), however,
predisposes these cases to a state court adjudication, with the opportunity for federal review. See
Amundson, Recent Judicial Decisions Involving Indian Water Rights, in Indian Water 1985, supra
note 7, at 3; Williams, Indian Natural Resource Development-The Impact on Poverty, in Part IV
of Rural Development, Poverty, and Natural Resources Workshop Paper Series 29 (1984).
15. Thorson notes that, of the five major Indian water rights cases that have been settled, four
of them were attached to existing water-supply projects: the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project in New
Mexico, the Ak-Chin and Papago Indian settlements in Arizona, and the Ute Indian agreement in
Utah. Thorson, Resolving Conflicts Through Intergovernmental Agreements: The Pros and Cons of
Negotiated Settlements, in Indian Water 1985, supra note 7, at 32. Also, the recent settlement of
the Ute Mountain Utes and the Southern Utes in Colorado is associated with the Animas-La Plata
Project, which will be constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation. Frazier, Animas-La Plata Is Just
Inches Short of the Goal, Rocky Mountain News, Sept. 20, 1986, at 63.
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cation processes are expensive and lengthy, with only uncertain results. 6
In both legal proceedings and negotiated settlements, information on

the quantity of the particular reservation's water right becomes important.
The common quantification procedure establishes the volume of water
required to irrigate the reservation lands.' 7 The amount of land to be
irrigated is described as the "practicably irrigable acreage" (PIA). The
term "practicably" constrains the extensive margin of land use. The
Supreme Court, in Arizona v. California, adopted an economic-viability
test, so that an approach applying benefit-cost analysis defines the PIA.'
A new chapter is beginning in the saga of Native American water
rights. The ability to effect a negotiated settlement to the resource dispute
solely in terms of water resources is diminishing as the opportunity for
relatively inexpensive, new water supplies declines. The situation, naturally, parallels the common perspective on the status of western water:
the era of structurally-oriented, water-resource development is ending;
the era of water management is beginning. Rarely will all parties be kept
whole in the physical volume of the water resource that they own. Indian
water rights that are perfected in the future, consequently, will affect
established appropriative water rights. They offer the prospect of a onefor-one transfer of the water right from established users to Indian tribes.
Such a transfer may be sufficient impetus to force many established water
users-primarily farmers-into bankruptcy.t 9
16. For example, four stream adjudications cost the Navajo tribe over $10 million in legal fees,
and the state government of Wyoming spent over $7 million in expert and legal fees opposing in
court the water claims in the Big Horn River basin. Marston, Indians Breathe Life into Old Treaties,
High Country News, Nov. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Marston, An Indian Water Victory Creates Turmoil
in Wyoming. High Country News, Nov. 25, 1985, at 13, col. I.
17. Delimiting the Indian fight through the amount of water required for irrigated agriculture is
done for Indians with reservations whose original purpose was farming. Other tribes own a right
that is based on alternative subsistence modes, the primary one being fishing. In the exceptional
cases, alternative standards like a fishery-based standard provide appropriate substitutes for an
agricultural standard. See J. Sax & R. Abrams, Legal Control of Water Resources 549 (1986).
18. Benefit-cost analysis was adopted by the Special Masters in both Arizona v. California in
1982, 466 U.S. 144 (1984) (amending order of 383 U.S. 268 (1966)), and the adjudication of the
Big Horn River System in Wyoming. The Special Masters' reports are, respectively, In the Supreme
Court of the United States, October Term, 1981, Arizona v. California, Report of Elbert P. Tuttle,
Special Master, February 22, 1982, and Special Master, In Re: The general adjudication of all the
rights to use water in the Big Horn River system and all other sources, State of Wyoming, No.
4993, Report of the Special Master (District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Wyoming),
December 15, 1982.
19. The notion that the current generation of irrigated-farm operators already receive an enormous
subsidy for their water is, to a degree, a fallacy. Much of the value of subsidized water was capitalized
into market prices of land to which the water is appurtenant. The first generation of owners of
reclamation water rights and irrigation-district shares appropriated the subsidy when they sold their
farms or ranches with associated water rights. For example, LeVeen and Goldman find that in the
Westlands project, a relatively youthful Bureau project, a majority of the irrigated land already had
been sold. LeVeen & Goldman, Reclamation Policy and the Water Subsidy: An Analysis of the
Distributional Consequences of Emerging Policy Choices, 60 Amer. J. Ag. Econ. 929, 932 (1978).
The degree to which the subsidies were appropriated throughout the federal reclamation projects
needs research, as it also becomes important when considering markets in reclamation water rights
and the fair appropriation of any ensuing windfall profits.
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The new chapter in Indian water will likely be contentious.' Deloria,
representing the Native American interests, warns that viewing water as

either Indian water or non-Indian water will mire the western water system
in legal procedures.2 The U.S. Supreme Court cases in the 1980s indicate
that the Court is addressing the more complex issue of balancing the
variety of water-resource needs.22 The cases give hope to established

water users that Indian claims do not simply represent a transfer of water
rights away from them. Yet the fact remains that the court system has no
clear precedent for dividing water in the context of Indian water. American

Indian law is a distinct body of law because of the unique status of Indian

tribes in the United States.23 Thus the equitable apportionment doctrine,
which the Court uses to allocate water resources fairly between and among
the states, does not strictly apply. Wilkinson emphasizes repeatedly the
novel dilemma that persists in the general context of American Indians:
In most cases, a crucial issue-seldom mentioned in the opinions
but implicitly a weighty presence to the parties and the judges-is
how an old treaty, statute, or court decision should be applied in
times bearing little resemblance to the era in which the words of law
were originally written .... The Court, presented repeatedly with
the option of honoring the old laws or of respecting the force of the
changed circumstances, mostly has chosen to enforce the promises.24

A sensible, equitable approach to apportionment remains the major dilemma in the Indian water issue.
An opportunity exists for the congressional and executive branches of
20. Thorson both discusses the stakes of the participants and searches for a common ground, yet
is generally pessimistic about the future of negotiated settlements without a new approach. See
Thorson, supra note 15, at 28.
21. Deloria, supra note 3.
22. Claibome, Indian Water Rights in the Supreme Court: A Review and Preview (paper presented
at Conference on the Federal Impact on State Water Rights, Natural Resources Law Center, University
of Colorado School of Law, 1984). Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review
the Wyoming Supreme Court's 1988 decision to allocate 480,000 acre-feet to Wyoming's Wind
River Reservation. Indian Water Resources, Water Market Update 8 (S. Shupe ed. May 1989). The
Court agreed to review the practicably irrigable acreage standard.
23. C. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 53-63.
24. Id. at 4-5. Wilkinson concludes:
After my long journey through this body of law, I have reached my own conclusion as to
why the field has developed as it has, as to the deepest reasons why the Court has refused
These old laws
to allow American Indian tribes to be engulfed by the passage of time ....
emanate a kind of morality profoundly rare in our jurisprudence. It is far more complicated
than a sense of guilt or obligation, emotions frequently associated with Indian policy. Somehow, those old negotiations--typically conducted in but a few days on hot, dry plains between
mid-level federal bureaucrats and seemingly ragtag Indian leaders-are tremendously evocative. Real promises were made on those plains, and the Senate of the United States approved
them, making them real laws. My sense is that most judges cannot shake that. Their training,
experience, and, finally, their humanity-all of the things that blend into the rule of lawbrought them up short when it came to signing opinions that would have obliterated those
promises.
Id. at 121-22.
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the federal government to clarify and specify the Indian water aspect of
the Winters doctrine-in effect, to mold legal doctrine through statutory
law rather than to wait for development of case law.2" This essay describes
a set of doctrinal guidelines in four recommendations to serve that purpose. 26 The recommendations concern the scope of the Indian water right
and the division of water between Indians and established water users.
Notably, they do not suggest a general legislative solution to the entire
class of Indian water claims that contain specific water volumes and
priorities, times and places. They focus, rather, on a general policy directive and a procedure to specify water-related property rights. 27 The
recommendations intend to provide clear, basic principles for the negotiated settlement of the disputes on a case-by-case basis, with the federal
government's participation at the negotiating table.
THE PREMISES
Three premises guide the content of the recommendations.
Premise One:
Indian communities on the reservationsshould be treatedat least as
well as the historical treatment of the agriculturalcommunities in
the West that were subsidized by the federal government through

development of irrigation water supplied by the Bureau of Reclamation.
The premise of "at minimum, equal treatment" derives from four perspectives: the property-right foundation for Indian water; the historic
public policy of subsidizing the establishment of irrigated agriculture and
rural communities in the West; the trust relationship between the federal
government and the Indian nations; and the federal endorsement of the
western states' authority to allocate and administer their nonnavigable
surface water.
Native American water rights were recognized in 1908 with the Winters
decision. 2' They exist as a matter of property law, co-existing with Indian
rights to reservation lands. Their origin is not a matter of ex post public
25. The Department of the Interior initiates and implements the vast majority of federal policy
on Indian water rights. It favors the negotiated settlement of outstanding Indian water claims. In
the area, the Department is more reactive to individual claims and disputes than proactive. See
Claiborne, supra note 22, at 9; U.S. Department of the Interior Departmental Working Group on
Water Policy, Summary of Activities (Oct. 29, 1986).
26. See infra, text accompanying notes 64-82.
27. The generality of the type of statutory law envisioned here is consistent with the second type
(of three) of congressional action characterized by Wilkinson: "While many Indian statutes have
dealt with individual tribes, a second kind of legislation is far more general. Congressional actions
have often set broad Indian policy but have left implementation to subsequent legislation or administrative action." C. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 10.
28. See supra note 5.
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policy. A latent conflict between Indian water rights and traditional ap-

propriative rights has festered since that time.
Public policy has exacerbated the conflict. The Bureau of Reclamation
(BuRec), since its inception in 1902 as the Reclamation Service, implemented the federal policy of western development. The BuRec had two
explicit goals: (1) to stabilize the "colony" of the West by establishing
communities that relied on a renewable resource (surface water) rather
than on depletable resources (gold, silver, or other minerals), and (2) to
nurture the "small" men and women of the region rather than to allow
speculators and corporations to develop the West's water resources.29 The
BuRec accomplished the goals by subsidizing water storage and water
delivery to the farm-gate. 3"
The sole purpose of Indian water rights, in comparison, is to enhance
the ability of Indians to sustain viable reservation communities through
a tribal economy and culture that, in the arid West, necessarily relies on
water. The purpose, importantly, is homologous to the institutional purpose of the BuRec. Indian rights are homologous to reclamation water
rights, yet they remain to be developed.

The BuRec developed water resources that easily could have been

developed for the Indian reservations.3 A portion of the resources, in
fact, was Indian property. The National Water Commission vividly makes
the point:
29. The original Reclamation Act of 1902 defined a program of federal financing of western
irrigation project construction with provisions stipulating an on-farm residency requirement for
recipients of reclamation water and a 160-acre limitation on farm size. 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (current
version in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
The twin goals of the Bureau of Reclamation followed Major John Wesley Powell's vision of the
American West. Powell concluded that the federal government needed to construct major on-stream
dams for water storage, and that irrigated farming should be done by family farmers in a cooperative
mode. Powell envisioned a return to the Jeffersonian ideal of agrarian settlement in place of the
tendency toward monopolization and speculation that he predicted for the unregulated development
of the West. J. Powell, A Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States, with a More
Detailed Account of the Lands of Utah (2d ed. 1879). On the topic of Powell and western water,
see W. Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian (1953) and the recent accounts: D. Worster, Rivers
of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (1985); M. Reisner, Cadillac Desert:
The American West and Its Disappearing Water (1986).
30. Bumess, Cummings, Gorman, & Lansford, United States Reclamation Policy and Indian
Water Rights, 20 Nat. Res. J. 807 (1980).
31. Berkman and Viscusi present a series of case studies documenting the duplicity, as opposed
to the benign neglect, of the Bureau of Reclamation in failing to recognize the Indian's water
interests. They devote one of eight chapters to Indian water in their study of the Bureau. R. Berkman
& W. Viscusi, Damming the West 151 (1973). In addition, Reisner asserts, "[o]ne of the leastknown consequences of water development in America is its impact on the Indians who hadn't
already succumbed to the U.S. Calvary, smallpox, and social rot." Reisner, supra note 28, at 194.
He continues with a case study of the decision to locate a reservoir on the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation in North Dakota, which forced the displacement of the Indians, rather than to locate it
on land occupied by non-Indians. Id. at 194-98. "The Fort Berthold Indians have never recovered
from the trauma they underwent. Their whole sense of cohesiveness was lost, and they adjusted
badly to life on the arid plains and in the white towns." Id. at 198.
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Following Winters, more than 50 years elapsed before the Supreme

Court again discussed significant aspects of Indian water rights. During most of this 50-year period, the United States was pursuing a
policy of encouraging the settlement of the West and the creation of

family-sized farms on its arid lands. In retrospect, it can be seen that
this policy was pursued with little or no regard for Indian water rights
and the Winters doctrine. With the encouragement, or at least the

cooperation, of the Secretary of the Interior-the very office entrusted
with the protection of all Indian rights-many large irrigation projects
were constructed on streams that flowed through or bordered Indian
Reservations, sometimes above and more often below the Reservations. With few exceptions the projects were planned and built by
the Federal Government without any attempt to define, let alone
protect, prior rights that Indian tribes might have had in the waters
used for the project. Before Arizona v. California, referred to hereinafter, actions involving Indian water rights generally concerned
then existing uses by Indians and did not involve the full extent of
rights under the Winters doctrine. In the history of the United States
Government's treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to protect Indian

water rights for use on the reservations it set aside for them is one
of its sorrier chapters:"
The BuRec did not act independently. The U.S. Congress behaved with,
and promoted, the attitude that distributive politics governed the construction of water projects. The feeble political power of the Indians is
well known.
The federal government, collectively, also bears responsibility for the
dearth of Indian water development because of its trust relationship with
Indian tribes.33 When no conflict of interest exists between the government
and the competing established water users, the trust responsibility is like
that of a private fiduciary relationship. Thus, the situation in which the
BuRec as a matter of public policy developed water resources that conflicted with Indian water rights provides evidence of a breach of the trust
responsibility.' That the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the primary
32. National Water Commission, supra note 1, at 474-75.
33. Fine, Off-reservation Enforcement of the Federal-Indian Trust Responsibility,7 Pub. Land
L. R. 117, 117 (1986). Fine notes that the entire federal government has a trust responsibility for
Indians although the responsibility is primarily associated with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id.
Also, the fact that the time period during which Indian water rights were unused coincides with the
period of the federal policy of assimilating Indians into the majority culture is important: this is
when the trust responsibility reached its peak because Indians could not rely on their traditional
tribes and cultures for sustenance. Wilkinson emphasizes the importance of viewing Indian law and
policy in the historical context of the tension between the disparate goals of assimilation and
separatism. C. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 13.
34. The activities of the federal government in developing reclamation water rights and in implementing the federal Indian trust relationship are important to contrast. The original development
of reclamation water by the Bureau of Reclamation is not the implementation of a fiduciary relationship with western settlers; rather, it is a public policy. The federal-Indian trust relationship is
rooted in solemn promises and law. A conclusion, then, is that no conflict-of-interest existed in the
original development of water for white settlers when the water was a Winters Doctrine fight: the
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representative of the federal government in the trust relationship, is a
sister agency of the BuRec in the Department of the Interior only magnifies
the breach. Winters rights, although originating in an independent legal
doctrine with the status of federal superiority, failed to be asserted in
favor of the "rule of capture" of the prior appropriation doctrine, to which

reclamation rights subscribe.
The record of federal capital investment in irrigation illustrates the
importance that the federal government placed on non-Indian water-resource development relative to Indian development (Table 1). New capital
investment represents the effort to perfect water rights. The spending by
the BIA relative to the BuRec was significant before 1940. After 1940,
however, the relative effort of the BIA became paltry.
TABLE I
Federal Investment in Irrigation (Thousands of Historical Dollars)

Bureau of Reclamation

Pre-1920

1920-1939

1940-1959

129,510

120,736

1,206,483

1960-1978

2,156,419
Bureau of Indian Affairs
14,851
33,569
28,733*
36,743
*Bureau of Indian Affairs actually spent less than this amount in the period because the Census
reports the figure as an aggregate along with other expenditures by minor irrigation organizations.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Agriculture: Census
of Irrigation Organizations, Census Years 1950, 1959, 1969, 1978.

The final element of the federal role is the federal government's active
endorsement of the western states' authority to allocate and administer
their nonnavigable surface water. The endorsement began with the Desert
Land Act of 1877,"5 endured many divisions of interstate water by compact
higher responsibility of the government was in representing the Indian interest in the manner of a
private fiduciary; it had no fiduciary responsibility to develop reclamation water. The situation repeats
itself frequently in the tension between reclamation water rights and Indian reserved water rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in its 1982 term, though, that the federal government's trust
relationship with Indians had to be balanced with its responsibility for non-Indian water interests in
a state water-right adjudication that was final in 1944. Nevada v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2906
(1983). The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe asserted in the recent case that the federal government had
a conflict-of-interest in representing both water interests, as the water that the Newlands Reclamation
Project received in the adjudication should have been used, in the Tribe's opinion, to satisfy a
reserved water right. The Court decided that no conflict existed: the government, in effect, had a
fiduciary responsibility to both groups. See Amundson, supra note 14, at 12.
The important point is the distinction between proximate and ultimate perspectives. The ultimate
perspective is the earlier conclusion: the fiduciary responsibility of the government for Indian water
interests was higher than the ex ante public-policy interest in reclamation water. In Nevada v. United
States concerning the Pyramid Lake Pauite Tribe, the proximate perspective was litigated. The
perspective was satisfactory in that context because the reclamation project already was operational.
The context of this essay, though, correctly takes the ultimate perspective on the tension between
the two genera of water rights, reclamation and reserved.
35. Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§321-339 (1982)). The
Desert Land Act recognized the western states' authority to administer water resources. See J. Sax
& R. Abrams, supra note 17, at 298-99.
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and equitable-apportionment decree, endured the BuRec's conformance
with state water law when developing reclamation water, 6 and culminated
with the recent federal willingness to adjudicate federal reserved rights
in state proceedings for consistency with the McCarran Amendment.37 It
represents a tacit federal endorsement of the appropriative water rights
that were developed solely with private capital. These rights, which represent the majority of western surface water development, also diminished

the Indians' stature in water.
The conclusion is Premise One: the Indian communities should be
treated at least as well as the historical treatment of the recipients of
federal water subsidies. The conclusion derives from three facts: Indian

water rights are property, the property was ignored, and the agent for the
Indians did not adequately represent the interests of its client. It relies

neither on a social-equity policy of affirmative action for past injustice
nor on a social-welfare policy of a minimum income per capita. Rather,
it relies on a public policy, now anachronistic in general, of developing
the West with irrigated agriculture.
The provision that entertains the possibility of "better treatment" than
their non-Indian neighbors recognizes the notion of the time value of
money, that is, that a dollar payment 80 years ago, because it has had
the opportunity to accrue interest, is more valuable than a dollar payment
today. The subsidized development of Indian water could have occurred
decades ago; Indians could have been receiving profit from water use for
a long period. A comparable perspective holds that the Indian water rights,
which are of high priority among western water rights, should receive

an accumulated series of annual rental payments for their historic use."
36. As a matter of comity, reclamation water rights were established as traditional appropriative
water rights. Comment, Federal Appropriation and the Reclamation Act of 1902, 57 Neb. L. R.
403, 405 (1978).
37. McCarran Amendment of 1952, 43 U.S.C. §666 (1982).
38. The U.S. Supreme Court recently resolved an interstate water dispute by requiring monetary
compensation for a past violation of an interstate water compact. New Mexico was directed to pay
Texas monetary damages for accumulating a 340,100 acre-foot deficit of Pecos River water over 34
years. New Mexico, Texas Wrestle over River Flow Repayment, U.S. Water News, December 1987.
A numerical example edifies the concept of profits foregone by the absence of Indian water
development. Assume that an acre-foot of water creates an annual marginal value of $5, which is
reasonable in agricultural water applications, and that the real interest rate is 3 percent. Further,
suppose that the Indian right to the water went unused for a 100-year period, e.g., from 1889 (the
treaty date of a hypothetical reservation) through 1989. The current value in 1989 of using the acrefoot each year for 100 years to create an annual financial value of $5 is $3,180. (An annual value
of $2.50 per acre-foot, for example, halves this amount.) The mathematical expression for the current
value is
100
f 5-exp[(.03)t1dt=$3,180,
t=0
where exp is the exponential function, which is used in continuous-time compounding. The amount
of $3,180 per acre-foot applies for the entire volume of a particular Indian water right. For perspective,
the volumes of three established Indian rights range from 58,300 acre-feet per year for the Ak-Chin
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Indians with legitimate water rights arguably deserve compensation equal
to the present value of the foregone annual profit or rental, compounded
from the date of the water's initial use to the present time. This premise's
provision for "better treatment" is made in lieu of compensation of this

nature.39

Premise Two:
The non-Indian, established water users whose appropriative and
reclamationwater rights conflict with Indian water rights should not
simply forfeit their water rights. Their financial status should continue at a level equal to their historicalprofitfrom water use. Maintaining the financial status, though, may require a combination of
a water right, at a reduced volume, and monetary compensation.

Disputes over Indian water offer the prospect of a one-for-one transfer
from the established water users to the reservation tribes. The transfer,

notably, can be a direct taking of the resource without compensation.'
This leads naturally to discussions of restraining the Indian right,' and
to Indians' suspicion of non-Indians' law and motives.42
Two perspectives support Premise Two: the strong confirmation by the
state and federal governments that appropriative and reclamation water
rights represent secure property rights, and the policy supporting the
development of western communities through irrigated agriculture. The
federal government, as described earlier, 3 repeatedly placed the authority

for water law with the individual state governments. Western communities, both rural and urban, made substantial capital investments in watercommunity and 76,000 acre-feet per year for the Papago Reservation in Arizona, to 370,000 acrefeet per year for the Navajo Reservation in Northwest New Mexico and Northeast Arizona, to
900,000 acre-feet per year for the five tribes bordering the Colorado River in California and Arizona.
J. Folk-Williams, supra note 7, at 13, 14, & 20. Multiplying the Ak-Chin volume by the rate per
acre-foot yields $185,394,000. This provides context for the topic of foregone profits from the
absence of Indian water rights.
39. Wilkinson, notably, finds aspects of the Indian water right in which the passage of time works
to the Indians' advantage:
Thus Arizona v. California I [the 1963 decision] lets time work triply in the tribes' favorin stark juxtaposition to the prior appropriation system, which locks in water rights at the
time of their original use. Indian water rights are given an early date, no later than the date
when the tribe puts the water to actual use. The rights can expand and include sufficient water
for future needs and are not limited to those needs that prevailed at the time the reservation
was established. The needs are defined by the quantity of land that up-to-date technology can
make usable. To westemers, this is nothing short of heresy.
C. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 71. This essay argues that the favorable intertemporal elements of
the Indian right are necessary, in part, to compensate for the foregone intertemporal profit from early
non-Indian use of Indian water.
40. That this transfer of property may be made without compensation is emphasized in Brookshire,
Watts, & Merrill, Current Issues in the Quantification of Federal Reserved Water Rights, 21 Water
Resources Res. 1777 (1985) and Weatherford, Wallace, & Harold, supra note 9, at 26.
41. Collins recognizes the malleability of the Winters Doctrine. Collins, The Future Course of
the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. Colo. L. R. 481 (1985).
42. Deloria, supra note 3, at 1786.
43. See supra, text accompanying notes 34-36.
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using infrastructure that depended on state law. They perceived that the
investments were made in accord with law.
Two recent contributions edify these perspectives. Wilkinson recognizes that the non-Indian settlers of the West made good-faith investments
in both land and water assets that properly belonged to Indian tribes.'
He writes:
These [non-Indian] expectations cannot harden automatically into a
right to be free of all tribal laws. The tribes had expectations, too,
and they were merged into treaties and treaty substitutes that protected
historic tribal prerogatives within reservation boundaries. Yet neither
can the expectations of the non-Indian residents, themselves premised
upon open invitations tracing to federal law, fairly be ignored. The
recurrent, essential task for the judiciary in Indian law has been to
construct a reconciliation of the laws to which the two sets of expectations trace.45
And elsewhere:
If latter-day Indian claims seriously jeopardize good faith settlers,
then Congress retains authority to reach legislative solutions based
on the particularized needs and equities, as it did in resolving tribal
claims to large areas in New Mexico, Alaska, and Maine.'
Huffaker and Gardner argue in a related context that reclamation water
rights should not be retroactively restructured by unilateral action of the
federal government as this would violate constitutional due process. 7
They conclude that the taking of appropriative and reclamation water
rights generally fails a test of fairness. The task rests with either the
Congress or the judiciary to reconcile the dispute.
The taking of the rights, moreover, counters the eighty-year public
policy of nurturing sustainable western communities. A neutral policy of
permitting the evolution of the communities, in response to economic
incentives, from an agricultural base to an urban and industrial base seems
sensible. An active policy of eroding the agricultural character of the
West by transferring water away from its established users, in contrast,
should be avoided. The possibility of forcing the users off the farm is
real." The importance of the cultural fabric of western agricultural com44. A close analogy exists between the cases of Indian reservation land and Indian water rights.
As with the development of water rightfully attached to a reservation, the federal government

encouraged the homesteading by non-Indians of reservation land. In general, the settlers were unaware
that their homesteads rested on Indian land. On the topic of conflicts over reservation land, see
C. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 22-23.
45. Id. at 23.
46. Id. at 44-45.
47. Huffaker and Gardner argue this in the context of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982.
Huffaker & Gardner, The "Hammer" Clause of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 26 Nat. Res.
J. 41 (1986).
48. See supra note 19.
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munities should not be ignored in the process of recognizing the economic,
cultural, and ethical imperatives of developing sustainable Indian communities.
Premise Three:
The federal government has the rightand the responsibility to pursue

a cost-effective resolution to the water disputes on a case-by-case
basis. Premises One and Two constrain the government in the endeavor. The responsibilityfor cost efficiency stems from the government's representationof taxpaying citizens.
The third premise gives the federal government flexibility in the waterrights negotiations. The government uses the flexibility to achieve a costefficient settlement to each water conflict, that is, to minimize the federal
expenditure required to satisfy the Indian and non-Indian interests. The
U.S. Department of the Interior currently provides a similar type of
mediation service with most Indian claims.49 The set of premises, however, gives clarity to the stakes and responsibilities of the major interests.
Two factors guide the search for a cost-efficient settlement.5 0 First, the
water-supply situation in the pertinent area is a major variable: is the river
basin fully appropriated, can existing water-storage projects be enlarged,
can new water-storage projects be constructed, and/or is groundwater
available to substitute for surface water? Second, the Indians and the
non-Indians must be willing to accept a portfolio of water and money,
rather than an endowment of only water,'as a resolution to a water conflict.
In effect, a nonstructural approach to the issue is feasible. The notion of
substituting money for water, historically, was unacceptable. It now is
common with the modem attitude of recognizing the commodity value
of water. A complete substitution of money for water by the government,
however, is impermissible because of the symbolic value of water in the
West.
THINKING THROUGH THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE
INDIAN WATER RIGHT: FICTIONS AND FALLACIES
Quantifying Indian water rights has developed into a reasonably welldefined procedure: benefit-cost analysis is applied to establish the reservation's practicably irrigable acreage and the associated irrigation water
requirement. Indians' flexibility in using the water rights remains less
clear. For example, must water be used for the "original purposes" of
the reservation, and can water be transferred to non-Indians for use on
or off the reservation? 5'
49. See supra note 25.

50. The third major recommendation discusses the points in more detail. See infra, text accompanying notes 68-76.
51. Sax and Abrams present a textbook treatment of these and other current legal issues that are
associated with Indian water rights. J. Sax and R. Abrams, supra note 17, at 548-72.
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A thoughtful approach to structuring the issues requires the use of legal
and economic fictions." Fictions, as artifices, can be helpful in organizing
information, guiding inquiry, and making "good" decisions. Indian water
claims require fictions: water rights that were recognized in 1908, that
date to the 1800s in priority, that frequently conflict with completely
developed river systems, and that, now, must be made a reality, need a
few conveniences. Some aspects that guide the inquiry into, and the
decision's surrounding, Indian water rights must be accepted as the best
approach to the issue although they may appear arbitrary when scrutinized. These are fictions. Fallacies, relatedly, fail close scrutiny. They
are wrong, not merely arbitrary. The various fictions, along with some
fallacies of benefit-cost analysis, follow.
Seniority of the Indian Water Right
The seniority trait of the Indian right has been treated consistently as
coincident with the date of the individual treaty establishing each reservation. This treatment gives to Indian water rights a trait that corresponds
to traditional appropriative water rights. This essay recommends that
Indian water rights continue with a priority date set by the origin of the
reservation. The recommendation relies on two reasons: to be generous
in defining this trait of the water fight as a means of compensating for
the century of ignoring the Indian property (substantially Premise One)
and to simplify the calculations required to quantify the right.
The Practicably-Irrigable-Acreage Standard
The practicably-irrigable-acreage (PIA) standard is a legal fiction for
quantifying the Indian right. The standard simply states that the tribes
should receive sufficient water to irrigate all of the irrigable reservation
land. In contrast to the retrospective treatment of the Indian rights' priority,
the PIA has been implemented using current economic variables (including irrigation technology).53 The combination of these approaches leads
to Indian rights of large volume and senior status.
52. One definition of "fiction" is as a legal term that means, "islomething accepted as fact without
any real justification, but merely for the sake of convenience." American Heritage Dictionary 488
(6th ed. 1976). Adding the word to the vocabulary of economics makes explicit a common practice
of economic reasoning: using devices that lack true empirical substance to aid in the development
of both economic theory and economic pedagogy. For example, the notion of an equilibrium in an
economic system permitted the advance of economic theory and facilitated the instruction of economics at the level of simple principles. An explicit recognition of economic fictions would improve
the economist's ability to communicate within the profession and, more important, to engage in
useful dialogue with other professions. For a compelling advocacy of the improvement of economic
rhetoric, see McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J.Econ. Lit. 481 (1983).
53. Brookshire, et al., argue, with good logic, that the Indian water right should be a set of water
rights of varying seniority and volume to mimic the change in economic variables through time.
Brookshire, Watts, & Merrill, supra note 39. However, they lack a general perspective on the issue
that this paper introduces with the explicit statement of premises and the use of the historical record
of western water-resource development.
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The normative notion that Indians should develop agricultural communities on the reservations underlies the rationale for rooting the definition in agriculture. This notion was acceptable historically, as agricultural
development was an original purpose of most reservation lands. The
notion becomes outdated, however, in the modem context of a diversity
of water uses and a general decline in agricultural water use. The fact
that the quantification procedures use the PIA standard, yet Indian water
rights are not limited to agricultural uses, reflects the fictional nature of
the standard.
The PIA standard benefits Indian tribes in some respects because of
its land-based nature: most of the reservations are relatively extensive in
land.54 A population-based standard, for instance, likely would result in
less Indian water. The provision for an expansive water right is by design.
The U.S. Supreme Court, when adopting the PIA in 1963, chose the
standard so that the "present and future needs" of the reservations would
be achieved in a single adjudication. 55 The choice demonstrates remarkable foresight, as a land-based allocation links the endowment of water
to the Indian nations' most binding long-run ecological constraint. A
population-based standard, on the other hand, would be a difficult target
for which to make a projection.
The discussion reveals the weakness of current attempts to limit the
Indian water right to an amount that allows a reasonable standard of living
to the extant generation of Indians. The reasoning of the PIA standard is
to satisfy the current and future needs of the reservations. A replacement
for the standard must provide for future needs. The PIA accomplishes
that, in a logical fashion, at one moment for all time.
The simple truth is that Indian water rights represent a resource endowment-a wealth endowment-that is designed to make life possible
on the reservations. Their symbolic value to Native Americans implies
that the government cannot simply give Indians money, rather than water,
to resolve the Indian water conflict. However, any quantification standard
is a fiction.
Implementing the PIA Standard Through Benefit-Cost Analysis
The procedure of assessing practicably irrigable acreage has been implemented as an economic test, using a benefit-cost-analytic approach to
54. Williams argues, though, that establishing the right based on a utilitarian value may diminish
its volume. She refers to the Indians' cultural, religious, and aesthetic appreciation of water that
transcends a value-in-use. Williams, supra note 14.
55. The PIA standard explicitly intends to satisfy present and future needs:,
We ... agree with the Master's conclusion as to the quantity of water to be reserved. He
found that the water was intended to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the
Indian Reservations and ruled that enough water was reserved to irrigate all of the practicable
irrigable acreage on the reservations.... We have concluded, as did the Master, that the
only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is
irrigable acreage.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963).
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measure the feasibility of irrigated agriculture. To reason that a benefitcost test is required to ensure economically-efficient water use among
sectors commits a fallacy. The reasoning violates the economic dictum
that, once an initial endowment of a resource is made, a free choice by
an individual necessarily results in economic efficiency. 6 The benefitcost approach does guarantee an efficient allocation of water. However,
it represents only one particular distribution among many feasible distributions of the resource that are efficient. Benefit-cost analysis in effect
takes a narrow view of efficiency by focusing only on the final resource
allocation (the resource-use product) rather than on the mechanisms that
a society chooses to foster efficiency (the resource-allocation processes).5 7
Economists emphasize voluntary exchanges in competitive markets as a
resource-allocation mechanism that promotes efficiency. The initial endowment of the resource commonly is understood as an issue of fairness.
The statement of water-allocation efficiency that is analogous to the general neoclassical dictum reads: regardless of the initial distribution of
water rights among individuals, the ability to transfer the rights in competitive water markets guarantees an efficient final allocation of water.
Once the Indian tribes establish their water rights, subsequent water-use
decisions are efficient by definition provided that the rights are transferable.
The benefit-cost-analytical approach to water-allocation decisions frequently imposes a culturally-biased standard of water use on the Indians.
For example, a particular tribe may prefer to leave water in the stream
as part of a religious belief. Benefit assessment typically undervalues this
activity. Another tribe may choose to grow low-value crops for its own
subsistence rather than high-value crops for market. Benefit assessment
assigns a value to the subsistence activity below the value of, say, raising
vegetables in the winter for markets in the northern United States. Must
the tribes develop golf courses and water fountains (or, for that matter,
irrigated farms) as their route to economic improvement? Or can selfinterested behavior and freedom of choice prevail?
The distinction, in essence, distinguishes between an economic-means
56. The statement reflects the substance of the major theorem of modem welfare economics: a
competitive market equilibrium is Pareto efficient, i.e., one individual's welfare cannot be improved
without another's welfare being diminished. The theorem relies on the existence of competitive
markets and an absence of externalities. See H. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 147 (1978).
57. Kneese and Brown adopt this limited view of efficiency in their section, "The Form of a
Speculative Solution," proposing a solution to the allocational issue engendered by Native American
rights. A. Kneese & F Brown, supra note 9, at 86. Other aspects of their solution are more
enlightened, e.g., their recommendation of water use in any economic enterprise rather than only
in agriculture. Brookshire, et al. also advocate the use of a narrow test of economic efficiency. They
write, "Several solutions to this impasse are available.... For example, the opportunity cost of
taking water from non-Indian users (if any) to irrigate Indian lands should also be considered....
Appropriate analyses, such as efficiency studies of water allocations, could be incorporated into
these studies." Brookshire, Watts, & Merrill, supra note 39, at 1783.
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test and an economic-efficiency test.5" The accurate view of benefit-cost
analysis, in this instance, is as an economic-means test. Benefit-cost poses
the issue simply as: do the benefits of Indian water use exceed the costs
of water development? The existence of transferable water rights and
competitive markets, on the other hand, provides more compelling evi-

dence of economic efficiency. The contemporary division of water resources among Indian tribes and non-Indian communities fundamentally

represents an issue of fairness.
The view that benefit-cost analysis is unambiguous in its application
demonstrates a second myth.59 In the context of the PIA standard, for
example, should it be implemented using the economic and technological
variables that exist today, that existed in 1908 with the advent of the
Winters doctrine, or that existed at the date of the reservation's origin?
More subtly, should the institutional environment of federally-subsidized
western water-resource development be included as a second class of
variables in addition to the economic environment? The choices of output
prices, irrigation-technology costs, water-conveyance costs, and BuRec
water-subsidy rates affect the economic analysis that quantifies Indian
rights using the PIA standard.
Finally, Burness, Cummings, Gorman, and Lansford demonstrate that

the view of benefit-cost analysis as only a narrow efficiency criterion is
a myth.' Benefit-cost analysis is a social-accounting approach; it differs
markedly from private financial analysis. In this vein, they apply ethical
principles to guide the choices of the economic and institutional environments for the benefit-cost analysis. 6 ' They make three recommenda58. These perspectives on the limitations of benefit-cost analysis and on the distinction between
an economic-efficiency test and an economic-means test are critically important in another major
topic of water allocation, the division of water between and among the states. The same conclusion,
that benefit-cost analysis and an economic-means test are only one route to allocative efficiency,
applies to the equitable apportionment doctrine. Tarlock accurately states the point:
Equitable apportionment actions require the Court to strike a balance, between the protection
of existing uses and the initiation of new uses, that tends to maximize the value of the
Existing uses may not be the most efficient use of the water, but it does not
resource ....
follow that an equitable apportionment is necessary to promote efficiency; the market is the
best method of determining efficiency.
Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. Colo. L.
R. 381, 41 t (1985). Trelease is excellent on the related topic of how the equitable doctrine and the
commerce clause should blend. Trelease, State Waterand State Lines: Commerce in WaterResources,
56 U. Colo. L. R. 347 (1985).
59. Burness, Cummings, Gorman, & Lansford develop these ideas in an important line of research:
United States Reclamation Policy, supranote 29; The NewArizona v. California:PracticablyIrrigable
Acreage and Economic Feasibility, 22 Nat. Res. J. 517 (1982); PracticablyIrrigableAcreage and
Economic Feasibility: The Role of Time, Ethics, and Discounting, 23 Nat. Res. J. 289 (1983).
60. Burness, Cummings, Gorman, & Lansford, Practicably IrrigableAcreage and Economic
Feasibility: The Role of Time, supra note 58.
61. The reader should delight in the irony of the process to broaden the benefit-cost criterion to
include equity issues: the courts turn to economists by adopting an economic perspective to resolve
the property-right interest; Burness, et al., economists, understanding the malleability of this perspective, infuse it with equity principles. Id.
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tions: (1) use a low discount rate in the PIA evaluation; (2) subsidize the
operating, maintenance, and repair costs of the hypothetical evaluation
at the same rate as other BuRec water-development projects; and (3) pay
for those subsidies by raising the electricity prices (that is, by reducing
the electricity subsidies) paid by recipients of power generated by BuRec
projects.
In conclusion, it is important to develop an educated view of benefitcost analysis. Benefit-cost analysis is not the only means to efficiency, it
has an important equity aspect, and it requires that many important choices
be made during its application. Further, it simply is wrong to view the
PIA standard as necessarily more than a quantification procedure. For
example, if one is searching for a high rate-of-return for Indian water
and is linking that return to quantification, merely pose the hypothetical:
How much water could a Colorado River tribe sell to southern California
at a profit? The benefit-cost analysis of this option surely results in quantifying a very large volume of Indian water rights. Implementing the PIA
standard through benefit-cost analysis only represents a means of quantifying property rights, not of assuring either economic efficiency in water
use or sustainable reservation communities.
The Native American Right: Analogous to an
Appropriative or a Riparian Right?
Some commentators62 argue that the Indian water right is appurtenant
to the reservation lands, thereby effectively construing the right as a
modified riparian water right. Two facts lead to their conclusion: the
simultaneous creation of the rights along with the reservation lands and
the absence of forfeiture of the rights through nonuse. Based on this,
they argue that, like a riparian fight, sales of Indian water separately from
reservation land should not be permitted.63
The definition of the Indian water fight as a riparian right is a fallacy
rather than a useful legal fiction. The location of Indian reservations in
the West implies strongly that, as Indian water claims are perfected, their
integration into the prior appropriation system becomes an important goal.
A ban on the transfer of Indian fights reduces the potential economic
efficiency of western water use and, coincidentally, reduces the potential
economic return to Indian tribes.' The fallacy of Indian rights as riparian
rights has no redeeming virtue.
62. See, e.g., Palma, Considerations and Conclusions Concerning the Transferability of Indian
Water Rights, 20 Nat. Res. J. 91, 94 (1980).
63. Alienability of Indian water rights remains an issue that the federal government must consider
because of § 12 of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 730-31 (1834) (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982)). The act requires congressional approval of the sale of Indian lands as a
means of protecting the Indians from non-Indians acting in bad faith. Its purview may extend to
water rights.
64. Sax and Abrams make this point. I. Sax & R. Abrams, supra note 17, at 556.
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RECOMMENDATION ONE: QUANTIFICATION
The initial step toward resolving the issue of surface-water use involves
establishing the volume of Native American rights. This recommendation
adheres to the current procedure: using a benefit-cost approach to establish
the reservation's irrigable acreage and the water required for its irrigation.
Premise One, that Indians should be subsidized at a rate equal to or better
than non-Indians, guides the features of the recommendation. The features
are specific in places, although specific numbers should not be considered
hard and fast rules. Within the structure of the recommendation, some
numbers may be increased and others lowered provided that the recommendation retains its general intent.
(1) For the purpose of quantification, the Native American water
right represents a right to water delivered to the reservation-gate at
a cost subsidized by the federal government, that is, it is more than
simply a right to water in the stream. This agrees with the historical
policy of subsidizing water conveyance from the river to the farmgate. Use the weighted average of the unit cost of the water that the
BuRec has under current contract as the unit cost of this delivered
water.6 In the economic analysis of agricultural feasibility, this would
be the per unit cost of conveying water to the reservation-gate. As
most of the water at issue comes from rivers flowing through the
reservation, this may not be a major subsidy, but the Indians should
not have to bargain away a portion of their water right to obtain this
subsidy. The subsidy, effectively, is a distinct right. It treats equally
Indians and their non-Indian neighbors.
(2) Use the unlined earthen canal as the on-reservation, waterconveyance technology for the analysis. Use either furrow or flooding
irrigation technology, depending on the type of crop evaluated. Use
modern water-pumping technology for lifting water to a higher elevation. Use current factor prices to calculate the cost of constructing
the agricultural capital. This general provision has a generous impact
on quantification.
(3) Treat capital costs in the analysis in a manner consistent with
either the BuRec project-evaluation procedures before the cost-sharing era or the provisions of Section 2 of the Leavitt Act. 6
(4) Use a two percent interest rate to evaluate the investment.
This rate is below the market rate of the cost of capital as a premium
to favor the financial feasibility of the project.
(5) Use product prices that include federal agricultural price sub65. For example, Bumess, et al. report that this unit cost is $2.50 per acre-foot in 1977. Burness,
Cummings, Gorman, & Lansford, supra note 29, at 823.
66. See the three articles by Burness, Cummings, Gorman, & Lansford, supra notes 29 and 58,
for a thorough review of BuRec procedures. The Leavitt Act of July 1, 1932, 47 Stat. 564 (1932),
"defers repayment of construction costs only for projects irrigating Indian lands." DuMars & Ingrain,
Congressional Quantification of Indian Water Rights: A Definite Solution or a Mirage?, 20 Nat.
Res. J. 17, 33 (1980).
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sidies. If farm-product markets are deregulated in the future, then
use current, stable prices in the analysis.
The recommendation for quantification, by necessity, forms an amalgam of old policy, old agricultural practices, and new prices and costs.
By design, it translates hypothetical water rights into certain, adjudicated
rights. It permits the passage of time to work in favor of Indian interests:
the irrigation and conveyance technologies permit the pumping of water
but do not demand the most recent water-conserving devices. This compensates for this century's dearth of Indian water-right perfection and
water-resource development.
RECOMMENDATION TWO: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
ON THE RESERVATION
Keep perspective on the original purpose of the Winters doctrine, to
develop sustainable communities. Two elements of the recommendation
help to achieve this goal:
(1) Each tribe has a right to the subsidized delivery of its water
to the reservation-gate. The right is distinct from the tribes' paper
water right. It can be used at any time. In effect, the government
fixes a rate of subsidy (analogous to the policy of the Bureau of
Reclamation), and the tribe retains the option to use it, once, at the
most beneficial time.
(2) Indians maintain a range of flexibility in using their quantified
rights. They do not need to establish a conventional beneficial use
of the water to perfect the right. They can choose to apply their water
to non-agricultural uses. They can choose to sell or lease their water,
on or off the reservation, subject to normal constraints of the prior
appropriation doctrine, other state law, and interstate water law.67
Divorcing quantification and use of the Indian right becomes an important emphasis of the recommendation for sustainable development.
The current method ties explicitly the development of a PIA analysis with
both quantification and a project that uses the water. Pushing the Indians
into agriculture rather than allowing a distinct Native American development path has had negative consequences. The case of the Navajo
Indian Irrigation Project in northwestern New Mexico provides an ex67. The recommendation to integrate Indian water rights into traditional water law was controversial when settling the water claims of the Ute Mountain Ute and the Southern Ute tribes of
southeastern Colorado. The major impediment to a negotiated settlement was the Ute tribes' attempt
to have the right to transfer a portion of their water rights across state boundaries to the states of
the lower basin of the Colorado River. Although, prima facie, this violates the Colorado River
Compact, the tribes argued that they are not party to the Law of the River. For more information,
see Indian Tribes and Water Marketing, Water Market Update 6 (S. Shupe & J. Folk-Williams eds.
January 1987).
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ample. 8 The components of the recommendation guarantee a subsidy,
yet provide flexibility in its timing. Everyone benefits from this; in particular, the original goal of Indian water becomes attainable.
At the same time, to be balanced, a well-conceived plan tying together
quantification and water-resource development should be acceptable. That
is, separating quantification and development need only provide a conceptual distinction to alert Indian tribes to their property-right status.
Tribes should reserve the right to pursue development along with quantification. The flexibility, in fact, allows for an inherently desirable quality
of a negotiated settlement to the water-resource dispute: a mix of features
to a comprehensive settlement may be the cost-effective approach to
settlement; for example, combining water-storage and water-conveyance
facilities, financial compensation, and a variety of water-supply sources
may be the cheapest form of settlement.
RECOMMENDATION THREE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Enough time has elapsed since the modem recognition of Native American water rights in 1963 for the West to recover from an initial collective
gasp at their prospect. It is incumbent, now, to resolve outstanding claims.
The issue has clarified in some ways: the general format of the quantification procedure is established; the legal arena of jurisdiction-the state
courts-is clear; the incentives to achieve a negotiated settlement are
evident. Past experiences set a pattern for the future.
The successful negotiated settlements relied on creating new water
supplies to resolve inherent conflicts between Native American rights and
established appropriative rights. Both parties substantially remained whole
in their water-resource endowments. Indian water claims were belatedly
attached to water-development projects already under construction or
awaiting construction. The recent negotiations relied on the same approach: to enlarge or create water-storage capacity.69 The politics of the
approach are self-evident, as it is the traditional way to obtain a federal
subsidy by linking Indian water to the federal reclamation program.
Urging Indian nations to negotiate settlement of their water claims
remains the prevailing approach. The future course of the settlements can
take one of two directions. The Indians and the established users may
coalesce effectively to persuade the federal government to subsidize the
development of new, expensive water supplies as a means of settlement.
Both Wilkinson and Collins argue that possibly a new niche has opened
68. DuMars and Ingram extensively document the Navajo situation. DuMars & Ingram, supra
note 65.
69. See J. Folk-Williams, supra note 7, at 22; Marston, Indians Breathe Life into Old Treaties,
supra note 16; Marston, An Indian Water Victory Heats Turmoil in Wyoming, supra note 16.
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for the BuRec in developing water supplies to be shared between the
Indians and the 7established users,7" that is, to "wrap the project in an
Indian blanket." '
Alternatively, the "iron triangle" of western water development-the
coalition of Congress, the BurRec, and western water interests-may
have dissolved. A nonstructural approach to resolving the generic Indian
water conflict may dominate because of fewer opportunities to attach
Indian claims to moderately cheap, new water-supply sources. Thorson
writes of the new context:
The "larger pot" era is coming to a close. There is more difficult
competition for our existing water supply, and it is difficult to finance
expensive new storage and delivery projects. The real test of negotiated settlements of Indian water disputes has yet to come....
There is room for creative new policies which identify and build
upon mutual interest. But the overriding challenge will be for Indians
and non-Indians to equitably and peacefully share limited water resources 72
A nonstructural approach, rather than the structural tradition, needs to be
conceived of as a viable alternative.
The recommended approach to the general issue consists of searching
for the cost-effective combination of water and money that, first, maintains the financial integrity of Indians and non-Indians and, second, provides a water endowment to both groups. The water-supply situation in
a particular river basin represents the major variable in the search. The
water in many western river basins is completely appropriated. A creative
approach, when this is the case, is either to share the water supply on a
pro-rata basis between the two parties or to construct a water-storage
project that enhances the supply. A water-sharing arrangement requires
compensatory financial payments to sustain material status. A waterstorage project should be evaluated to account for both construction and
environmental costs. The government chooses the cost-efficient alternative.
• A generic approach to the case of scarce water supply follows." The
traits of the water resource at issue are those of one or more appropriative
70. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. Colo. L. R. 317, 327 (1985); Collins,
supra note 40, at 487.
71. Berkman and Viscusi write, "Nevertheless, it is often said on Capitol Hill that a Reclamation
project has a better chance of passing if it is presented 'under an Indian blanket'-in other words,
if the project includes some benefit for Indians. Unfortunately, it is usually true that Indians get only
a blanket-a token," R. Berkman & W. Viscusi, supra note 30, at 151.
72. Thorson, supra note 15, at 45.
73. Moore presents additional details of this method of settlement. M. Moore, An Economic
Approach to Conflict Resolution: The Case of Native American Water Rights (1986) (unpublished

manuscript).
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water rights. The traits include its relative priority in the water-rights
queue (which establishes a probability of receiving water from the naturally varying water source), its volume, and its status as a direct-flow
right or a storage right. A quantification proceeding establishes the Indian
right to water in terms of priority and volume. The right, then, becomes
like an established appropriative right. To clarify the stakes of the dispute,
a one-to-one correspondence is identified between the Indian right and
the established rights. That is, competing claims to the same water are
identified.
One method of settling the property dispute-the nonstructural methodwould be to share equally the water right between the Indian tribe and
the appropriative-right owners with which it conflicts. This water-sharing
agreement is analogous to a 50 percent pro-rata division of the water
right. The annual economic benefit of water use in this case is denoted
B; this magnitude simply is the aggregate revenue from the shared use
of the existing water.
Monetary compensation paid to both parties keeps them whole. The
benchmark for measuring wholeness is annual profit received by established water users from historical water use. The difference between
historical profit and profit generated by using half of the original water
right measures the monetary compensation due each party. Twice that
amount, consequently, measures governmental expenditure. The amount
of expenditure required to keep the parties whole becomes the measure
of cost efficiency.
A federally financed water-storage project that keeps both parties whole
by means of water endowment provides an alternative method of settling
the dispute. The utility of a storage project comes from its reduction of
the natural variability of supply. Indian users and established users share
equally the water supply from the project. Denote as B 2 the economic
benefit of a project; this represents the aggregate revenue of using the
stored water supply. Monetary compensation may be needed to maintain
the groups' endowments although at a lower rate than in the nonstructural
approach. The project, further, has capital, operating, maintenance, and
environmental costs; denote the costs, on an annualized basis, as C.
Adopting the maximum of either B, or (B2-C) establishes the settlement
generating the highest aggregate net benefit.74 This also corresponds to
the perspective of cost effectiveness. It is cost-effective because it min74. In a simulation of the two alternatives, the equal-sharing alternative yielded an annual,
aggregate expected profit of $1,233,820 (B, = $1,233,820) and the water-storage alternative yielded
an annual, aggregate profit of $1,240,357 (B2= $1,240,357). The choice of the cost-efficient alternative, then, simplified to whether the total annual costs of the storage project were greater or less
than $6,537. The analysis assumes that both the Indians and the non-Indians use their water in
agricultural production. See id. at 12.
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TABLE 2
Account for Water-Sharing Agreement and Water-Storage Project
Alternative

Benefit

Cost

Net Benefit
B
1
BrC

Water-Sharing Agreement

B,

0

Water-Storage Project

B2

C

Cost-Efficient Alternative: Larger of B. or (BrC)

imizes the money spent by the government to keep both groups whole
in terms of monetary payments and storage project costs. Table 2 illustrates the two accounts of the alternatives.
Many readers, and particularly those concerned with the Native American stake, recognize that a plan to share equally the existing water supply
looks suspiciously like imposing the equitable apportionment doctrine on
the settlement.75 It is a modified equitable apportionment doctrine, with
the modifications including: (1) an equal, pro-rata division of existing
water rights at issue and (2) compensatory monetary payments to sustain
the wealth from each parties' original water rights.
The equal-sharing of the water resource differs markedly from the
recent evolution of the equitable apportionment doctrine to an economicmeans test. 76 The compensation payments, in addition, provide novelty
beyond the doctrine's traditional scope. Indian tribes probably would
choose litigation if federal policy becomes a traditional equitable apportionment approach. Without the additional traits of the recommendation,
an equal-sharing rule to resolve the water-resource disputes offers a poor
bargain to them.
The case of groundwater availability is one other important watersupply situation. Surplus groundwater offers an opportunity to substitute
groundwater for surface water in satisfying an Indian water claim; this
may be a cost-effective approach. The federal government must guarantee
the groundwater right's legitimacy, perhaps by its purchase. Further, the
government and the Indians must be cognizant of the rising extraction
cost of many groundwater reserves as depletion occurs, the government
in a search for cost efficiency and the Indians in ensuring that they do
not inherit a water supply whose cost increases through time because of
groundwater mining. The basic notion of substituting between ground75. The equitable apportionment doctrine provides one means of dividing among the riparian
states the water of an interstate river. See Tarlo6k, supra note 57, at 411. Indian interests do not
trust an approach premised solely on the equitable apportionment doctrine as they perceive it as a
means of diminishing their water right.
76. Id. at 408-09. An economic-means test is different from an economic-efficiency test. As
discussed previously, it is based on the product of resource use rather than the process of resource
allocation. See supra, text accompanying notes 55-60.

Sumnmer 1989]

NATIVE AMERICAN WATER RIGHTS

water and surface water to minimize water supply costs, though, forms
a tenet of enlightened state laws of conjunctive water use." It warrants
consideration in the Indian water context.
The courts currently do not have the ability to consider Native American
claims and their associated water disputes in a framework similar to this
recommendation. The stakes of the parties are evident in a courtroom
setting. Established water users likely hope that the Supreme Court is
lurching toward a pure equitable apportionment approach to the issue.
They would prefer, in fact, an apportionment test based on the financial
product of water use as it imposes a culturally biased standard. Indian
nations likely fear an apportionment approach because it considers only
a narrow set of issues; it is dissimilar to the modified version described
above. As an alternative to the courts, a federal legislative proposal could
define a clearer set of principles and goals to guide negotiations over
Indian water rights.
RECOMMENDATION FOUR: SOURCES OF FUNDS
The prior recommendations require federal expenditures to meet a
fundamental goal, fairness. A call for new government funding increasingly falls on deaf ears, however. The federal reclamation program provides one opportunity to earmark certain government revenues for use in
resolving Indian water claims. Judiciously shaking the reclamation piggy
banks in search of money has a certain logical appeal.
The federal government maintains the option of charging higher prices
(and changing the mix of customers) for water and power services of
BurRec projects when the current delivery contracts expire. Water-service
and power-service contracts generally run for 40 years. Reimbursable
aspects of projects are considered repaid when the contract elapses. At
that time, the notoriously low administered prices of the BuRec can be
raised to an equilibrium market price, for example, through the use of
water-commodity auctions. The time profile of project construction suggests that revenues from free-market water could provide a sizeable source
of funds after the year 2000.78
Provisions of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 may give a more
immediate new source of revenue. 79 The Act furnishes incentive for irrigation districts to amend their current contracts, thereby agreeing to pay
the full cost of water on leased land in excess of 960 acres, rather than
being coerced to pay the full cost of water on leased land in excess of
77. Tarlock, An Overview of the Law of Groundwater Management, 21 Water Resources Res.
1751 (1985).
78. Huffaker & Gardner, supra note 46, at 41.
79. 43 U.S.C. §390 (1982).
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160 acres."0 The magnitude of the prospective funds will become clearer
when final reports on implementation of the Act become available.

Federal and state policies to simplify reclamation-water transfers and
to increase their potential market offer a third possibility. Voluntary market

exchanges of water could be accompanied by a windfall profit tax, with
its revenue earmarked for settling Indian water claims. Such a program
could provide a source of revenue that bridges the gap to the major BuRec

recontracting period after the year 2000.
The famous Reclamation Fund and the River Basin Funds represent
final prospective sources of funds. The Reclamation Fund, in fact, is the
general account for revenues from reimbursable reclamation services. It

serves as the financial source for congressional appropriations to operate
the BurRec, including project construction. In 1982, the unappropriated
Reclamation Fund balance reached $785,432,000.8 Additions since then
exceeded $100,000,000 annually. 2 The River Basin Funds were designed

to cross-subsidize the construction of irrigation projects with power projects.8" The three major western river basins-Colorado River, Columbia
River, and Missouri River--each have such a fund. An examination of
the Funds may reveal some unappropriated money that could be earmarked for Indian water claims. For example, the power projects in the
upper basin of the Colorado River-Flaming Gorge on the Green River
and Curecanti on the Gunnison River-were designed to supplement
funding of upper-basin projects. Many of the projects, though, will not
be constructed in the foreseeable future. The importance of unresolved
80. Huffaker & Gardner, supra note 46, at 42.
81. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1982 Summary Statistics: Volume
1I, Finances And Physical Features 89 (1982).
82. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the Interior, What Are Revenues? (1987) (unpublished manuscript).
83. Reisner describes the ironical twist in the economics of dam and project construction of crosssubsidizing irrigation with hydro-electricity:
With river-basin accounting, one could take all the revenues generated by projects in any
river basin-dams, irrigation projects, navigation and recreation features--and toss them into
a common "fund," The hydroelectric dams might contribute ninety-five cents of every dollar
accruing to the fund, while the irrigation features might contribute only a nickel .... The
beauty of river-basin "accounting," from the Bureau's point of view, was that it would be
literally forced to build dams. The engineering mentality which, Robinson himself admits,
came to dominate the Bureau's thinking in the 1930s and 1940s created an institutional distaste
for irrigation projects. They were a necessary nuisance that provided the rationale for what
Bureau men really loved to do: build majestic dams. In the past, however, the infeasibility
of many projects put a damper on their ambitions, because if a project didn't make economic
sense, they lost the rationale then needed to build a dam to store water. With river-basin
accounting, the equation was stood on its head: a lot of bad projects--economically infeasible
ones--created a rationale for building more, not fewer, dams. The dams-all with hydroelectric features, of course-would be required to compensate for the financial losses of the
irrigation projects; the losses would miraculously vanish in the common pool of revenues.
M. Reisner, supra note 28, at 140-42.
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Indian water claims justifies a review of the Reclamation Fund and the
River Basin Funds.
CONCLUSION
Water is central in the West. The conflict over Indian water claims is
a central resource issue in the West. The depth and breadth of its impacts
loom large.
Indian nations and established water users have an ethical and legal
basis to persuade the federal government to become more involved in the
issue. Federal participation according to this paper's recommendations
has several positive economic consequences: sharing of Indian water with
established water users avoids exacerbating the decline of rural economies; generous treatment of the Indian stakes promotes a sustainable
economic development of reservation communities; the dispute-resolution
process becomes clearer, thereby avoiding the money and time spent in
litigation (which creates no new wealth); and reducing the pervasive
uncertainty in western water promotes formation of more complex water
markets (which create new wealth).
The custom in the West is to emphasize the need for comity in disputes
over water resources. Comity, though, does not substitute for clear, welldefined procedural rules when reconciling a dispute. The prior appropriation doctrine, the equitable apportionment doctrine, and the opportunity
for interstate compacts provide the procedural rules, traditionally, in western water matters. Indian water rights fall outside of the normal rules of
western water. Inordinate amounts of comity do not begin to settle Indian
water claims.
This essay integrates the law, economics, public policy, and history of
western water development into a framework for evaluating Native American water rights. The framework, represented in three premises, specifies
a context of fairness. The recommendations contained herein develop a
comprehensive, cohesive approach for considering Indian claims. They
outline a blueprint for a fair and cost-efficient resolution of the water
disputes by defining specific rules for the reconciliation process. Simultaneously, traits of the recommendations provide incentive for economically efficient water-resource use.
Outstanding Indian water claims inject real uncertainty into the western
waterscape. Extreme positions on the issue naturally exist, characterized
by threats of leaving either non-Indians or Indians high and dry. The issue
develops into a complex web of efficiency and fairness, of property rights
and treaties, of good faith and questionable public policy. In this light,
this essay offers a middle ground on Indian water, a central position for
reasonable people who are concerned about western water matters.

